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Abstract. Banking industry is risk management business. One specific risk is the 
rate of return risk (ROR) in the banking book. This study estimates the duration 
gap of IBs and its determinants in the context of ROR risk. Using Duration Gap 
Model and Two-Step Robust Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), with a 
sample of 50 IBs from 13 countries, for the period 2007-2015, our empirical 
findings are: (a) time series and cross-sectional duration gap of IBs reflecting 
significant variations across the banks and countries; (b) IBs have a general 
tendency of maintaining a higher duration gap compared to their conventional 
counterparts, and are exposed to increasing ROR risk due to their larger duration 
gaps and severe liquidity mismatches; and (c) there is significant difference in 
the estimated coefficients of idiosyncratic factors influencing the duration gaps 
of IBs. This study provides direction to the IBs to reflect upon the significance 
of liquidity mismatch risk. 
Keywords: ROR risk, Islamic banks, Duration Gap, IFSB, BCBS, GMM
Abstrak. Industri perbankan adalah bisnis manajemen risiko. Salah satu risiko 
spesifik adalah risiko tingkat pengembalian (ROR) dalam banking book. Studi ini 
memperkirakan kesenjangan durasi IB dan determinannya dalam konteks risiko 
ROR. Menggunakan Duration Gap Model dan Two-Step Robust Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM), dengan sampel 50 IB dari 13 negara, untuk 
periode 2007-2015, temuan empiris kami adalah: (a) time series dan cross-
sectional durasi gap IB yang mencerminkan variasi signifikan di seluruh bank 
dan negara; (b) IB memiliki kecenderungan umum untuk mempertahankan 
kesenjangan durasi yang lebih tinggi dibandingkan dengan rekanan konvensional 
mereka, dan terpapar pada peningkatan risiko ROR karena kesenjangan durasi 
yang lebih besar dan ketidaksesuaian likuiditas yang parah; dan (c) terdapat 
perbedaan yang signifikan dalam estimasi koefisien faktor idiosinkratik yang 
mempengaruhi kesenjangan durasi IB. Studi ini memberikan arahan kepada 
IB untuk merenungkan pentingnya risiko ketidaksesuaian likuiditas.
Kata kunci: Risiko ROR, Bank Syariah, Kesenjangan Durasi, IFSB, BCBS, GMM
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Introduction
The modern global Islamic financial services industry (IFSI) has grown in 
magnitude and geographic coverage. It has now become an integral part of global 
finance. This integration with international financial markets and institutions 
today, along with the wide geographical expansion of market activities outside 
the traditional jurisdictions of Asia and the Middle East, demonstrates that Islamic 
finance has the potential to develop as a stable financial system (Sau Ngan and 
James, 2012). The IFSI’s resilience, anchored by the specificities of Islamic finance 
and various inbuilt stabilisers such as unbridled leverage, lack of synthetic and 
exotic products, limited use of financial product engineering, stable funding base, 
etc., has been recognized to be an important asset to the global financial system, 
which can contribute to the growth and a new level of soundness, stability, and 
inclusiveness. Nonetheless, despite Islamic commercial banks’ (ICBs) steady growth 
across the globe, they have not been immune1 to risks and vulnerabilities, given 
that ICBs operate in the same financial and economic environment of dual banking 
(Chattha and Bacha, 2010). 
From the perspective of the business model of an ICB, its activities are 
exposed to a variety of financial risks such as credit risk, liquidity risk, equity 
investment risk, market risk, benchmark rate risk or rate of return (ROR) 2 risk 
and operational risk (IFSB-1, 2005). Additionally, the economic and financial 
environment in dual banking systems inevitably exposes ICBs to the problems 
encountered by conventional commercial banks (CCBs), especially benchmark 
rate risk (Bacha, 2004; Chattha and Bacha, 2010; Chattha and Alhabshi, 2017, 
2018; Chattha et al., 2019). In particular, the ROR risk in the banking book of 
an ICB, which is dealt with in Pillar 2 (IFSB-16, 2014) of the BCBS and the 
IFSB3 standards, if not properly managed, has the potential to pose a substantial 
danger to an ICB’s earnings and capital base. Consequently, an effective risk 
1 In particular, liquidity mismatches have played a role in bringing financial distress to ICBs 
(e.g. Ihlas Finans in Turkey in 2001 and Investment Dar Group in Kuwait in 2008).
2 Interest rate risk (IRR) or ‘profit rate risk’ or ‘benchmark risk’ or ‘rate of return’ is used 
interchangeably in the study. Khan and Ahmed (2001) use ‘benchmark risk’ or ‘ROR’ terminology 
instead of ‘IRR’ so as to avoid unnecessary confusion since ICBs do not deal directly with interest 
rate. Subsequently, this term was used by the IFSB (2005) and other academicians and researchers 
(e.g. Ariss and Sarieddine, 2007, Chattha and Bacha, 2010, etc.). 
3 Basel II has three Pillars (BCBS, 2006). Pillar 1 is about minimum capital requirements, 
whereas Pillar 2 presents the supervisory review process of CCBs, while Pillar 3 covers the disclosure 
requirements of the CCBs. Building on this, the IFSB has outlined its equivalent standards, specifically 
IFSB-15 (2013), IFSB-16 (2014) and IFSB-4 (2007), corresponding to Pillar 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
Jamshaid Anwar Chattha. Estimation of Duration Gap and its Determinants for Islamic Banks  19
http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/iqtishad
DOI: 10.15408/aiq.v13i1.13868
management process addressing the ‘economic value perspective through duration 
gap model’ is essential to ensuring the safety and financial soundness of an ICB. 
This perspective is not sufficiently addressed in the literature and is thus the 
focus of this study. 
Benchmark rate risk has received considerable academic attention in recent 
years and has been developed from a number of different perspectives. This 
considerable eminence in the banking sector is due to various factors, including: 
(a) the increasing instability of benchmark rates, (b) financial market conditions 
including the reason for a flat yield curve and the risk of yield curve remaining flat 
for a longer period, and (c) the growing international emphasis on the supervision 
and control of banks’ benchmark rates under Basel II. Existing literature has 
discussed IRR management extensively (David, 1995; Dermine, 1985; and Duan 
et al., 1995). One of the popular techniques used in conventional literature to 
measure the benchmark rates is the ‘Duration Gap Model’. Many researchers 
including Bierwag et al. (2000), Bierwag et al. (1983), Bierwag and Kaufman 
(1985, 1992), Chattha and Bacha (2010), Gup et al. (2007), Kaufman (1984), and 
Sharma (2005), advocate that the duration gap can be considered a much better 
approach to quantify the effect of benchmark rate changes. While these studies 
provide important techniques to measure the duration gaps of CCBs, which can 
subsequently be adopted to calculate the duration gaps of ICBs, they fall short 
of identifying any specific causes which influence the duration gaps of financial 
institutions, in particular the ICBs. 
While studies directly related to risk management, risk reporting and 
disclosure of ICBs have been conducted by Khan and Ahmad (2001) and Mohd. 
Ariffin (2005), risk management tools and practices are covered by Alam and 
Masukujjaman (2011), Chattha and Bacha (2010), Chattha and Alhabshi (2017, 
2018), Fauziah et al. (2011), Hassan (2009), Khalid and Amjad (2012), Mohd. 
Ariffin et al. (2009), Ben Selma Mokni et al. (2014), Romzie (2009), Romzie 
and Abdul Rahim (2015), Sundararajan (2002) and Zainol (2015). However, no 
specific study has been conducted to explain time-series and cross-section variations 
in the ICBs’ duration gaps for a longer period. In addition, the existing work also 
does not provide enough evidence on (a) whether ICBs have more gaps on a long-
term basis compared to CCBs, (b) the main factors influencing the duration gaps, 
and (c) the implications of higher duration gaps for ICBs and their supervisors 
under Basel Pillar 2. These factors can enable the ICBs to be on a level playing 
field with their counterparts, the CCBs. These factors can be used by both ICBs, 
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The current study attempts to bridge this research gap from an Islamic 
finance perspective. Based on the existing literature and the gaps identified in the 
previous studies as specified in Section 3, in the context of the ROR risk, this 
study seeks to address the following objectives: (a) estimation and magnitude of 
duration gap across the ICBs and countries, and (b) whether there is any significant 
difference in the estimated coefficients of idiosyncratic factors influencing the 
duration gaps of ICBs.
Using various quantitative techniques such as Duration Gap Model, 
Panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), supported by Fixed Effect and 
Random Effect Regression, with a sample of 50 ICBs from 13 countries (which 
have a significant presence of Islamic finance), for the period 2007-2015, our 
empirical findings reveal: (a) time-series and cross-sectional duration gap of ICBs 
reflects significant variations across the banks and countries; (b) ICBs have a 
general tendency of maintaining a higher (more) duration gap compared to their 
conventional counterparts, the CCBs; (c) ICBs are exposed to increasing ROR 
risk due to their larger duration gaps and severe liquidity mismatches, and (d) 
there is a significant difference in the estimated coefficients of idiosyncratic factors 
influencing the duration gaps of ICBs. 
The following section discusses Islamic finance with its key specificities 
and explains the theoretical and regulatory framework for ROR risk for ICBs. 
Section 3 reviews the important arguments regarding the measurement of the 
ROR risk through the duration gap approach, followed by the identification of 
key determinants of the duration gap. Section 4 presents the description of the 
data and methodology, including the application of the Duration Gap model and 
Panel GMM. In Section 5, we cover the empirical results of the findings. Finally, 
the last section concludes the entire study, and includes a presentation of the key 
findings and the theoretical conclusion, and the practical implications. 
Theoretical and Regulatory Framework
To comprehend the implications of the study, we need to understand the 
theoretical and regulatory considerations behind the purpose of this study. 
Islamic Banking – Leading Segment of Islamic Finance 
It is important to reflect on the key developments in the Islamic banking 
sector before presenting theoretical and regulatory considerations. According to 
the IFSB Islamic Financial Stability Report (2018), Islamic banking remains the 
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most dominant form of asset-based intermediation system. Aapproximately 80% 
of Islamic financial assets are held within the banking sector in different asset 
classes, products, and services. The industry’s assets remain heavily concentrated 
in the Middle East region and a select few Asian countries – the top ten Islamic 
banking jurisdictions account for almost 94% of the global Islamic banking 
assets. 
Moreover, the Islamic banking sector in some jurisdictions (e.g. Brunei, 
Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) is gradually 
becoming substantial. These jurisdictions seem to have achieved at least 15% 
market share for their Islamic banking assets than total banking assets. This suggests 
that these financial institutions account for more than 5% of the total global 
Islamic banking assets between them. The IFSB designates these jurisdictions as 
systemically important. This increasing prominence and higher market share of 
the industry poses a number of challenges for the stability of the financial systems 
where Islamic banks operate. In light of this, the vulnerability of ICBs to ROR 
risk remains a key concern, which is subsequently studied in this paper. 
Given the backdrop of a diverse range of policy actions, from ‘dovish’ to 
‘hawkish’, coupled with heightened geopolitical risks and conflicts affecting the 
financial sector in different regions, the key factors of success anchoring modern 
Islamic finance growth have progressed over time. These are outlined below. 
First, the specificities of Islamic finance such as underlying assets which 
connect the financial sector with the economic sector, risk transformation and 
comingling, profit-sharing contracts, Sharia-compliance requirements, responsible 
and ethical investments, etc. have led to the exploration of alternative financial 
intermediation after the GFC. Second, due to the persistent weaknesses in advanced 
economies facing significant deleveraging and slowdown in economic growth in 
the wake of the GFC, the emerging markets (EMs), including Asia have been 
performing significantly better, experiencing robust domestic demand driven by 
strong private sector consumption. This performance, coupled with the petrodollar 
strenght in the Middle East, has led to the development and promotion of Islamic 
finance. However, in recent times, the oil sector has witnessed dramatically plunging 
oil prices. Lastly, the presence of a conducive regulatory framework and enabling 
infrastructure to promote Islamic finance has been a key factor explaining the 
growth of Islamic finance across jurisdictions. 
One of the key elements of an ICB’s specificities is the structural differences 
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has different risk implications and effects on risk management. A closer examination 
of the schematic balance sheet of an ICB reflects a universal banking model where 
all the traditional intermediation functions (e.g. retail, core banking and investment 
banking) are performed. Additionally, this balance sheet exhibits peculiar features of 
the ICBs, which are different from their conventional counterparts, the CCBs. These 
specificities present various risks and implications for ICBs and play an important 
role at the supervisory level in developing of financial regulation for them. In this 
study, we address one of these risk implications for the ICBs. 
Risks in Islamic Banking Industry - Key Gaps 
While risks are an integral part of the banking industry, for both ICBs as 
well as CCBs, robust risk management differentiates and outlines the intensity of 
these risks and vulnerabilities to ensure financial stability and protection against 
other unintended economic consequences. However, the need for risk management 
at ICBs demands more attention due to the unique structure of their assets and 
liabilities. 
Numerous studies have been conducted on the risk management aspects of 
CCBs and ICBs; however, there is still a shortage of literature on certain risks faced 
by ICBs. Over time, risk management has emerged to be an important discipline 
that should be improved in light of recent developments in the GFC. Hence, 
despite common names (such as credit, liquidity, and operational risk), the nature 
of the risks and the means of dealing with them are different due to the distinctive 
intrinsic features of Islamic finance. Consequently, risk assessment systems should 
anticipate and measure these risks (Chattha and Archer, 2016; Khan and Ahmed, 
2001). Not many studies offer helpful insight into these developments, particularly 
with reference to ICBs’ stability, duration gap, and the internal capital adequacy 
assessment process (ICAAP). 
To address some of the key risks and distinctive risk features of Islamic 
financial transactions and contracts offered by the ICB, IFSB-1 (2005) provides 
comprehensive regulation on risk management controls through guiding 
principles. These controls are for both ICBs and their supervisors. According 
to risk, these 15 principles, which complement Pillar II of the Basel II, are 
grouped under six types (Figure 1). Figure 1 shows that ICBs are also exposed 
to other specific risks such as “Sharia non-compliance risk, fiduciary risk, ROR 
risk, and DCR”, in addition to the customary banking risks (e.g. credit, market, 
and operational risks). 
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In addition to those mentioned above the existing literature on risk 
management practices and tools from an ICB’s perspective shows a lot of variation 
yet seems to focus on general risk management practices without combining 
institutional and regulatory perspectives. There is a wide range of studies on risk 
management practices for ICBs in different countries for dealing with different types 
of risk (Al-Janabi, 2008; Alam and Masukujjaman, 2011; Al-Ajmi and Hameeda, 
2012; Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei, 2007; Ben Selma Mokni et al., 2014; Fauziah 
et al., 2011; Hassan, 2009; Hussain and Naysary, 2014; Mohd. Ariffin et al., 2009; 
Romzie, 2009; Romzie and Abdul Rahim, 2015; and Usman, Akhtar, and Ahmed, 
2011). However, none of the above authors has explicitly demonstrated specifically 
the need to measure the ROR and its impact on the ALM through the duration 
gap. After a careful review of these studies, it is observed that these studies have 
merely focused on general risk management practices with a qualitative focus on 
perception and practices. 
Figure 1: Categories of Risks in ICBs
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ROR Risk - Benchmark Rate in ICBs and Regulatory Dimension
Unlike CCBs, ICBs do not deal directly with the IRR or benchmark rate. 
However, as a matter of practice, most Islamic banking products and Sharia-
compliant financial instruments are priced regarding to a conventional benchmark 
rate (e.g. the LIBOR). Therefore, changes in the market rates will have implications 
for ICBs in terms of their earnings, value of assets, management of liquidity, and 
funding cost (Chattha and Bacha, 2010). In ICBs, investment account holders’ 
(IAH, also referred to as ‘PSIA’) funds are invested in fixed-return assets such 
as Murābahah; consequently, the IAH or depositors expect a return reflecting 
current market conditions. This return is related to market rates and relevant 
benchmark rates on the return on assets and on the returns payable on funding. 
This phenomenon is referred to as “ROR risk” by the IFSB. Therefore, contrary 
to an increase in benchmark rates (which may result in IAH having expectations 
of a higher ROR, while the returns on assets may be adjusting more slowly due to 
longer maturities), this scenario leaves the ICBs vulnerable from a risk management 
perspective, compared to their peers, and highlights an important consideration 
for their ALM (Chattha and Alhabshi, 2016; Chattha and Alhabshi, 2017, 2018).
For ICBs, various studies highlight the significance of the ROR risk from 
different perspectives (Akkizidis and Khandelwal, 2008; Ariss and Sarieddine, 
2007; Ben Selma Mokni et al., 2014; Fauziah et al., 2011; Greuning and Iqbal, 
2008; IFSB, 2005, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2015; Mohd. Ariffin et al., 2009; Romzie 
and Abdul Rahim, 2015; Vitria, 2008; and Zainol and Kassim, 2012). However, 
these studies do not capture and quantify the impact of ROR risk on ICBs through 
duration gaps. They also do not provide adequate guidance on identifying of 
variables that can serve as key determinants of duration gaps for ICBs. 
A bulk of the initial literature on the ROR risk emanates from the works of 
the IFSB, which has played an important role in explicating the ROR risk from 
various perspectives such as definition of ROR risk (IFSB-1, 2005), ROR impact 
on ICBs and various disclosures of ROR risk (IFSB-4, 2007), a mechanism to 
measure the ROR risk and DCR (IFSB GN-4, 2011), ROR risk in stress testing 
(IFSB-13, 2012), ROR risk and sound benchmark rate risk management (IFSB-16, 
2014), and the assessment of ROR risk under IMF-World Bank FSAP (IFSB-17, 
2015). Moreover, IFSB-1 (2005) suggests the use of the terminology ‘ROR risk’ 
for ICBs as they do not have their own benchmark rate, and they tend to use the 
market rate or relevant benchmark rate, such as the London Interbank Offered 
Rate (knows as “LIBOR”), in pricing their financial instruments. For instance, in 
the Murābahah contract, the rate is formulated from the LIBOR plus risk premium 
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and is held constant throughout the contract’s entire duration (Hassan and Lewis, 
2007; Khan and Bhatti, 2008). 
Following the GFC, the role of regulators and supervisors to highlight the 
adequacy and capability of an ICB’s management of risks during their normal 
supervisory review process, has been intensified. Both the BCBS and the IFSB set 
clear guidelines on risk management from supervisory perspectives, particularly 
for ROR risk. IFSB-16 (2014) has highlighted that it is essential for ICBs to 
have benchmark rate risk measurement systems, including a number of generally 
accepted techniques (such as gap analysis and duration gap analysis) for measuring 
the benchmark rates risk exposure of both earnings and economic value. The IFSB’s 
most recent work on ROR risk is in IFSB-17 (2015), also known as CPIFR 
(Core Principles for Islamic Finance Regulation), in which CPIFR 26 on ROR 
risk advocates that supervisory authorities should require ICBs (through policies 
and regulations) to have an appropriate ROR risk strategy and ROR management 
framework that provides a comprehensive ICB-wide view of ROR risk.4 
What is Duration Gap? Duration Gap for Measuring ROR Risk
The discussions in the previous section indicated the key implications of 
ROR risk and how they are relevant to banks. One conclusion acknowledged 
above is that the ROR risk is due to the maturity mismatch of a bank’s assets and 
liabilities. In addition, it was also established that one of the key tools to address 
the ALM is the duration gap approach. It is essential to define the duration gap 
concept to provide context for discussing relevant past studies on the issue in the 
next section. 
Gup et al. (2007), citing Bierwag (1987), define duration as “the weighted 
average time (measured in years) to receive all cash flows from a financial 
instrument”, and duration gap as the difference between the duration of a bank’s 
assets and liabilities. In simple terms, it is defined as the “weighted average maturity 
in which the weights are stated in present value terms” (Chattha and Bacha, 2010: 
16). On the other hand, similar to the BCBS, the IFSB provides an identical 
definition of duration measure, which is, “a measure of the percentage change in 
the economic value of a position that will occur given a small change in the level 
of benchmark rates” (IFSB-16, 2014: 40).
4 Prior to issuing IFSB-17, the IFSB Working Paper (2014) entitled “Evaluation by the IFSB 
of Core Principles Relevant to Islamic Finance Regulation” identified the need for the assessment of 
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There are two strategies when managing duration gaps – aggressive and 
defensive (Chattha and Bacha, 2010). The former would alter the duration gap 
in anticipation of changes in interest rates. For example, if interest rates were 
expected to increase, management would want to shift from a positive to a negative 
gap position — it could do this by reducing the duration of assets (DA) and /or 
increasing the duration of liabilities (DL). It is also argued that the expectation 
of falling interest rates would, of course, produce the opposite type of portfolio 
adjustment. The latter strategy within this context would seek to keep the DA equal 
to the DL, thereby maintaining a duration gap of zero. Thus, while an aggressive 
strategy seeks to profit from expected rate movements, a defensive strategy seeks 
purely to immunise net worth (NW). 
With the above considerations, this study offers deeper insight into the 
issue and gives ICBs guidance on managing their duration gaps. To the best of 
the authors’ knowledge, this is a pioneer study in Islamic banking involving a 
sample of 50 full-fledged ICBs from 13 countries for the period 2007-2015. In 
this respect, the study provides profound value addition to the existing corpus of 
literature, as follows: 
(a) enhancing the literature, with respect to Islamic finance, on the significance 
and calculation of the duration gaps of ICBs while factoring in country-
specific and sector-specific differences, 
(b) providing insight into the effectiveness of duration gap for managing the 
ROR in the banking book of ICBs, and how duration gap management can 
effectively help both the ICBs and the supervisory authorities with respect to 
ICAAP in the context of volatile ROR risk, 
(c) determining the factors influencing the duration gaps of ICBs, as there could 
be various causes contributing to higher duration gaps. 
The next section outlines relevant studies on this specific tool, i.e. duration gap 
for ROR risk.
Literature Review 
Duration Gap Perspective and Relevant Studies
Many classical studies assert that ALM has its origin in the duration 
analysis suggested by Macaulay (1938) and Redington (1952). Alden (1983) and 
Bierwag and Kaufman (1985) concluded that gaps, computed as functions of 
the DA and DL, are a more meaningful measure of IRR exposure for depository 
institutions than the simpler ones and more commonly used maturity gaps. 
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Duration gap analysis helps determine the exact amount by which the revenues 
from the assets increase or decrease depending upon the rise and fall of interest 
rates. Furthermore, in order to understand the classical work on the major 
highlights, developments and utilisation of duration gap theories and concepts, 
Bierwag and Fooladi (2006) provide a comprehensive historical perspective in the 
context of duration analysis. Bierwag and Fooladi (2006) argue that in much of 
the academic community, the concept of duration still remains something of a 
mystery and a curiosity, and it is often misunderstood and regarded as a flawed 
and oversold statistic. 
Alden (1983) presents one of the classical works on gap management 
with respect to managing IRR in banks. His work is classified as one of the 
pioneering studies of intellectual contribution to ALM and IRR management. He 
thoroughly outlined and revealed the “serious shortcomings” in the existing gap 
models (during that time). After providing reasonable and logical explanations 
against the existing gap models5, he explicitly supported the duration gap model, 
which is much more helpful in measuring the IRR exposure within banks. He 
provided technical calculations on the duration model in his work and suggested 
that duration analysis can be used for many purposes by banks, including hedging 
NW or MVE. Further extending his work on IRR management and ALM, he 
identified and described three ALM techniques: maturity gap approach, simulation 
approaches6, and duration gap approach. 
Bierwag and Kaufman (1985), in their work on duration gaps, described 
a number of single-factor duration gap equations that may help financial 
institutions control the value of a desired ‘target’ account. They elucidated that 
duration gaps provide “a more accurate description of the overall IRR exposure of 
the institution” that accurately gauges IRR for on-balance-sheet accounts. After 
Alden (1983) and Bierwag and Kaufman (1985, 1988), Dembiec et al. (1989) 
contributed another illustrious study on the application of ALM and duration 
5 Alden (1983) in his study states that to use the basic model, a bank must provide four 
pieces of information: (a) the length of time over which net interest income is to be managed, and 
usually ‘one year’ is chosen for this ‘gapping period’; (b) the bank must decide whether to protect 
the currently expected net interest income for the gapping period; (c) in the cases that the bank 
accepts an active strategy, an interest rate forecast for the gapping period is required; and (d) the 
bank must settle on the dollar amounts of the RSA and RSL. 
6 These are defined as computer designed modeling techniques with varying levels of 
sophistication, which provide results in a dynamic context. Regarding simulation models, it is argued 
that these models are often criticised as being ‘black boxes’, having unknown internal structures, 
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gap to the industry. They defined duration analysis as an index measure(s) of 
interest rate sensitivity for any series of cash flows taking into account both 
cash flow timings and magnitude. In their study, after determining the assets 
and liabilities, they used the modified duration measurement and incorporated 
estimates of the DA and the DL. 
 Entrop et al. (2009) specifically evaluate the robustness of the standardised 
framework proposed by the BCBS (2004) to quantify the IRR of banks. Their 
paper provides an empirical application of the BCBS framework on IRR for CCBs. 
Their empirical methodology and analysis use and calculate the duration gap and 
modified duration gap for assets and liabilities of the sample banks. Scanella and 
Bennardo (2013) maintain that ALM activities are conducted in the context of a 
bank’s sensitivity to interest rate changes, and IRR exposure can be measured by 
computing the gap between assets and liabilities, in each assets’ and liabilities’ maturity, 
and calculated for a set time horizon. They point out the two different approaches 
in measuring IRR exposure in banking. The first approach is the current earning 
approach based on the maturity gap model. The approach requires the accounting 
book value (historical-cost accounting). The latter approach, the duration gap model, 
is based on the economic value approach. The suggested application of these two 
approaches is consistent with the BCBS (2004). 
Although the aforementioned studies offer essential details on the significance 
of IRR and the calculation of the duration gaps of the CCBs, nevertheless, as 
expected, they do not deal with the specificities of ICBs. However, there are a 
few studies from the perspective of ICBs conducted by Khan and Ahmed (2001), 
Bacha (2004), Chattha and Bacha (2010), Chattha and Alhabshi (2017, 2018), 
Chattha et al. (2019) and Sun et al. (2014), which suggest the use of duration 
gap technique by ICBs to manage their asset-liability mismatch. There seem to be, 
however, a lot of gaps in these studies as they do not provide empirical evidence 
on the use of such a duration gap approach using GMM for time-series and cross-
section data, the magnitude of vulnerability of the ICBs to ROR exposure, and 
factors influencing the ICBs’ duration gaps in cross-country analyses.
Determinants of ROR Risk with Duration Gap in ICBs
The study pointed out in the previous section that most of the existing 
studies pertaining to duration gap are concerned with the various dimensions of 
duration gap and how the duration gap of a bank could be calculated taking into 
account different steps. This reveals the fact that one of the significant gaps in the 
duration studies is the lack of work determining and explaining the idiosyncratic 
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factors influencing the duration gaps of CCBs and ICBs. From CCBs’ perspective, 
there is a dearth of studies on this topic, and specifically in the case of ICBs, it 
is hard to find even a single study which captures and explains the duration gap 
in terms of explanatory variables. Therefore, we review the summary of available 
studies in this context. 
Saporoschenko (2002) examines the asset/liability differences and presents 
the relationship between the market and IRR of various types of Japanese banks 
for the period 1986-1992, and a set of on-balance sheet financial characteristics. 
Using Cross-Sectional Regression Model with the Bank Size, Total Deposits, the ratio 
of Deposits to Total Assets, and Assets Maturity (defined as shorter term assets and 
liabilities (SHORT)), he determined that these variables were generally positively 
signed and significant with degree of interest rate exposure. He further argues that 
if the duration of the assets were longer than the duration of the liabilities these 
results would be expected.
Ballester et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence on the main determinants 
of the IRR exposure of 23 Spanish commercial banks for the period 1994-2006. In 
the determination of the IRR, the empirical results are obtained through estimation 
of the empirical duration coefficients, and the study then uses the absolute7 value of 
empirical durations as the dependent variable in the panel estimation. The empirical 
results through Panel Least Squares and bank-specific Random Effects with Cross-
Sectional Regression reveal that Spanish banks, overall, show a considerable degree 
of exposure to IRR during the period of study. Furthermore, the study indicates 
that IRR exposure is systematically related to some bank specific characteristics, and 
a significant positive association is found between Bank Size, Derivative Activities, 
and proportion of Loans to Total Assets, and banks’ IRR exposure. 
Entrop et al. (2012) empirically explored and analysed how interest risk 
premia and other risk components are priced in bank margins. Their study 
sample included the German commercial banking sector spanning 10 years 
(2000-2009), taking into account ‘treatment of mergers and consolidation’. In 
their model, they ensured that all their regressions were estimated using Fixed 
Effects Two-Stage Least Squares. Using supervisory data and the information on 
volumes and maturities of different lender and borrower types, they calculated 
7 In their study, estimated empirical durations were found with ‘both positive and negative 
signs’, as it could be expected, but they took the ‘absolute value for panel estimation’. They argue 
that a higher duration, regardless of its sign, implies a higher IRR for the bank (greater variation in 
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modified duration gaps ‘to proxy for on-balance IRR’.8 The results indicated 
that duration gaps show positive effects, and almost all banking samples show 
a positive relationship with regard to duration gaps. In the context of duration 
gaps, their results also demonstrate that savings and cooperative banks have 
substantially larger duration gaps (DGAPs). 
Ruprecht et al. (2013) observe that banks are exposed to IRR through their 
function of transforming short-term deposits into long-term loans. They state 
that IRR is visible on the balance sheet as the maturity mismatch or duration 
gap. They used Cross-Sectional and Time-series Regression. In one of their models’ 
equations, they use modified duration gap as the dependent variable. Under the 
maturity gap, the other variables used as explanatory variables include Size, 
Saving Deposits, Liquid Assets, Total Asset Growth, Customer Loans, and Loan 
Commitment. They calculated the modified duration gap by first assigning the 
modified durations of the standard BaFin9 approach to the maturity brackets, and 
then summing up the volume-weighted assets and liabilities’ time-to-maturity 
brackets. They conclude that the maturity gap is largely determined by customer 
liquidity needs, whereas the decision to use swaps relies on the compliance with 
the interest rate risk regulation. 
Esposito et al. (2013) rely on the methodology of duration gap approach, 
whereby banks describe their IRR exposure as the potential effect of a parallel 
upward shift of the entire term-structure of interest rates on the present value of 
their future cash flows. Their paper adopted the ‘economic or capital perspective’ 
and measured Italian banks’ IRR following the guidelines proposed by the 
BCBS (2004). The study used Panel Regression for the period 2001-2011. The 
paper demonstrates the determinants of the on-balance sheet duration gap. The 
independent variables included in the study were: Size, Non-Performing Loans/
Total Loans, Funding Gap, Tier-1 Ratio, and ROE. The results concluded that the 
Italian banking system exhibited a limited exposure to IRR during the period under 
review, well below the regulatory alert threshold.
Racic et al. (2014) attempt to quantitatively assess and identify different 
balance sheet factors that have a statistically significant influence on banks’ exposure 
to IRR in developed (USA) and developing (Serbia) financial markets. For USA they 
8 Entrop et al. (2012) explain that an important issue when modelling IRR is the effective 
maturity assigned to de facto non-maturing savings deposits, as applying legal maturities of 3 and 
6 months would clearly overestimate the duration gap.
9 The BaFin is the financial regulatory authority for Germany.
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included 65 banks (2001-2010) and for Serbia 10 banks (2006-2010). A comparative 
analysis of the influence of the balance sheet characteristics was conducted based on 
the Regression Panel Model using the following variables as independent variables: 
Total Assets (TA), Equity to TA, Loans to TA, Deposits to TA, Net Interest Revenue 
to Average Assets, Non Interest Income to Net Income, Return on Average Equity, and 
Derivatives to TA. The results reveal that an increase in the share of deposits in the 
total assets of the U.S. banks reduces exposure to IRR, while banks in the Republic 
of Serbia experience an opposite effect. The coefficients also suggest that there are 
‘some empirical factors, whose effects are universal’. 
Khaliq et al. (2017) employ the duration gap analysis to measure the Islamic 
bank's sensitivity of bank assets and liabilities towards the rate of return risk due to 
the conventional interest rate volatility. Their empirical data and analyses covered 
a 5-year period using annually based data (2008 – 2012) for Malaysian Islamic 
banks only. Though, the quantitative results reveal that the majority of the Islamic 
banks are exposed to the interest rate risk but the study does not provide how the 
duration gap is estimated including estimating weighted duration of assets and 
liabilities and process of estimation. On one hand, this confirms the usage of the 
duration gap methodology; on the other hand, no explanation is provided how 
this methodology is used by the ICBs in their risk management and what are the 
implications. 
In addition to the aforementioned studies, there are some other studies 
which are of relevance to the present study. For instance, according to the classical 
economist, Elijah (1985), the maturity bucket approach attempts to solve the 
intra-period problem by measuring the gap for each of several sub-intervals of the 
gapping duration. In addition, with respect to the size of the banks Ruprecht et 
al. (2013) indicate that size leads pure banking book institutions to take more, 
but trading book institutions to take less, IRR on the balance sheet. Banks with a 
higher share of customer loan volume indeed have a higher duration gap. 
Landier et al. (2013) explore the transmission of monetary policy via banks’ 
exposures to interest risk, or duration gap. This study statistically shows, first, that 
the sensitivity of bank profits to IRR is larger when the duration gaps are larger, and 
second, that duration gaps also predict the sensitivity of bank lending to interest 
rates. On the other hand, Ruprecht et al. (2013) measure the impact of regional 
GDP and duration gap, as GDP is expected to influence numerous factors related 
to the supply and demand for loans and deposits. 
Furthermore, there is scant literature which describes possible idiosyncratic 
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factors and duration gaps for ICBs. One fact established from the discussion 
presented above is that there are some studies which have adopted duration gap 
as the dependent variable for measuring the impact of IRR for CCBs. In fact, to 
the best of our knowledge, it is hard to pinpoint even a single study from ICBs’ 
perspective which provides reasonable analysis. However, using the existing studies 
from CCBs’ perspective, this study adds significant contribution to the literature. 
Our approach and analysis can offer deeper insight into the issue and give guidance 
to ICBs on managing the duration gaps within their unique integrated regulatory 
system. 
Therefore, as for the choice of variables, after reviewing the literature, the 
study finds seven idiosyncratic variables: Liquidity Ratio, Liquidity Gap, Total 
Financing to Total Assets, Number of Maturity Buckets, Bank Size, GDP Growth, 
and Central Bank Policy Rate, which are important in identifying and explaining the 
dependent variable in this research through Panel GMM model. The descriptions 
of these variables and expected significant signs are presented in Section 4, along 
with the regression models and the specifications of the models. 
Methods
Data Used for the Estimation of Duration Gap for ICBs
We selected a sample of 50 ICBs from 13 countries, namely, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, UAE, and Yemen, for the period 2007-2015. The main reasons and criteria 
for choosing this sample and period are: (a) balanced panel, (b) latest data of 
full-fledged ICBs globally (instead of including Islamic windows or Islamic units 
or branches of the CCBs), and (c) full-fledged ICBs operating in dual banking 
systems (thus excluding Sudan and Iran). The accessibility of long-horizon data 
for the ICBs covering 2007-2015, with relevant information on the undiscounted 
contractual maturity breakdown of the assets and liabilities, was a critical concern 
that posed a serious challenge. It is worth mentioning that the sample countries 
hosting these 50 ICBs are leading Islamic finance jurisdictions, where almost 90% 
of the total Islamic banking assets reside within the dual banking system. The 
size of these 50 ICBs amounted to US$ 558 billion in 2015, including the top 5 
systemically important ICBs in terms of asset size, holding more than 70% shares 
of Global Islamic Banking Assets. 
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Figure 2: Data used for the estimation of Duration Gap for ICBs
Assets side Liabilities Side
Financing, net
Financing (or financing assets or sales receivables) 
using any debt-based contract such as Murābahah, 
CMT, Ijārah, Istisnā, Salam, etc. 
The study did not include Mushārakah and 
Mudārabah investment due to ex-post pricing 
mechanism. 
Deposits
All kinds of deposits backed by various 
Sharī’ah-compliant contracts, for savings 
account, current account, fixed maturity.
Due from banks and financial institutions PSIA or unrestricted investment account
CMT-based deposits (also known as 
Murābahah payables or Wakālah payables)
Due to banks and financial institutions
Note: For comparison, in the case of PSIA, we considered it as a deposit, instead of its legal status 
with respect to its contract. 
In order to calculate the duration gaps of ICBs, the data for the maturity 
breakdown of banks’ assets and liabilities is manually and individually extracted 
from the banks’ annual financial reports, required under the IFRS, for the sample 
period. This ensured that the extracted data is reliable. A very stringent validation 
process was carried out to ensure that the extraction process was clean and 
accurate. Figure 2 indicates the key considerations based on which the data 
was extracted for the ICBs. For the duration gap on the assets side, in order to 
determine the amount of financing, the study uses total financing (Chattha and 
Bacha, 2010; Chattha and Alhabshi, 2017, 2018; Chattha et al. (2019); Ruprecht 
et al. 2013) as the case may be, from one-month to long-term financing (all 
maturity buckets). Unlike CCBs, the data for the ICBs is complex due to the 
nature of the ICBs’ balance sheet, as Islamic banks can participate or provide 
financing to their customers’ projects or assets acquisition in numerous ways 
as per the principles of Sharī’ah. Thus, financing, from the ICBs’ perspective, 
is taken from five common debt-based contracts/instruments used by the ICBs 
across the various countries (Figure 2).10 Moreover, in our study, our estimation 
10 According to IFSB (2017), the data on “financing by type of the Shariah-compliant contracts” 
reveals that these five major financing contracts used by the ICBs as of 2017Q1 cover almost 85% 
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of duration gap only included ‘On-Balance Sheet’ items listed as financing (short-
term to long-term) on the asset side, and customer’s deposits (short-term to long 
term) on the liability side. 
Panel Data for ICBs in GMM Estimation
With respect to the Panel GMM, the sample of the study consists of 50 
ICBs with 450 observations reflecting a balanced panel (Table 1). Annual time 
series data for independent and dependents variables is extracted individually from 
the banks’ annual audited financial statements for the period 2007-2015. While 
other key relevant data such as GDP growth is obtained from the World Bank, 
central bank policy rates are obtained from the IMF. The size was converted to 
log value and all remaining data was held as a percentage.
Research Methodology
The research methodology comprises two-stages. Stage one uses Duration 
Gap model to calculate the duration gaps of ICBs; stage two uses Panel GMM. 
Stage 1: Determination of Duration Gaps of the ICBs 
Building on the conceptual understanding of duration gap (Section 3), the 
duration gap of a bank is demonstrated by comparing the weighted average DA 
(Equation 1) with the weighted average DL (Equation 2). In terms of a model, 
the study determines the duration gap with a four-step process, consistent with 
Koch and MacDonald (2009), Chattha and Bacha (2010), Chattha and Alhabshi 
(2017, 2018); Chattha et al. (2019):
(a) Determining the DA and DL for each asset and liability item of the balance 
sheet (in this study, financing and deposit);
(b) Finding the weight (proportion) of each item within its category;
(c) Calculating the weighted duration of DA and DL using (a) and (b); and
(d) Calculating the duration gap (DGAP) by deducting DA from DL.
Weighted Average Duration of Bank Assets (DA)
      (1)




 = Market value of asset  divided by the market value of all bank assets
 = Macaulay’s duration of asset  (Equation 3)
 = number of different bank assets
Weighted Average Duration of Bank Liabilities (DL) 
      (2)
Where,
 = Market value of liability  divided by the market value of all bank liabilities
 = Macaulay’s duration of liability 
 = number of different bank liabilities
The traditional Macaulay’s duration (D) calculation:
  (3)
Where:
D  = Duration 
CFt = Cash Flow at t time 
Y  = Yield to maturity or rate of discount 
T  = Time at which cash flow is received 
PV = Present value of the security 
n = Number of years to maturity 
Stage 2: Econometric Model and Specifications 
Conceptual Framework of the Model and Specifications 
In order to determine the idiosyncratic factors influencing the duration 
gaps of ICBs, the study develops Panel GMM supported by Fixed Effects (FE) 
and Random Effects (RE) regressions. The choice of the model, and reasons for 
the same, are explained below. The model consists of one dependent variable and 
seven bank-specific independent variables as reflected in the following Equation 
4. It is worth mentioning that Equation 4 includes a lagged dependent variable 
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i = 1, …, N; and t = 1, …, Ti; uit is the error term
Figure 3 summarises of the variables’ descriptions, expected signs, their 
source, and some references to previous papers in the literature that have 
also used these variables. Moreover, in addition to the aforementioned seven 
variables, one dummy variable is included to account for the crisis, specifically 
the GFC reflecting structural breaks. The expected purpose of using the GFC 
as a variable is to determine whether the crisis had any impact on the duration 
gaps of the ICBs. To serve this purpose, the crisis years of 2008 and 2009 are 
included in the model. The GFC takes a value of 1 for crisis and zero for no 
crisis.
Figure 3: Variables: Definitions, Expected Signs and Literature Review
Variable 
Name




Duration Gap model. It is the difference between the DA and 
DL. It is the weighted average time in terms of years, as defined 
in Section 3. 
(Ballester et al., 2009; BCBS, 2004; Bierwag and Kaufman, 
1985; Bierwag and Fooladi, 2006; Chattha and Bacha, 2010; 
Entrop et al., 2009, 2012; Esposito et al., 2013; Ruprecht et 
al., 2013; Van and Styger, 2006)
LIQR
Liquid assets ÷ Total Assets. The LIQR is the buffer of 
liquid assets as a share of balance sheet total assets, which 
may influence the duration gap. More liquid assets means the 
duration of assets will be lower. In general, according to the 
IFSB, core liquid assets ((i) currencies and (ii) deposits and 
other financial assets available on demand or within at most 
three months) comprise assets that are readily available to meet 
any demand for cash. They usually consist of assets maturing 
within one year held either in cash or near-cash equivalents. 
The study model utilised the core liquid asset ratio for LIQR. 
(Ruprecht et al., 2013) 
?*









The LIQG is the difference between the maturity mismatch of 
total assets and total liabilities in different maturity buckets. The 
mismatch can influence the duration gap both positively and 
negatively, depending on the direction of the maturity mismatch. 
The study modelled the LIQG as the gap difference between the 
short-term maturity (up to one-year) mismatch of total assets 
and liabilities in different maturity buckets. The difference is 
converted to a percentage of total assets for each year and for 
each ICB for the study’s observation. 
CLGAPi,t = (Risk Sensitive Assets one-year) – (Risk Sensitive 
Liabilities one-year)
 i (banks) = 1, … , N; and t (time in year) = 1,…,Ti
 (Elijah, 1985; Esposito et al., 2013; Khan and Syed, 2013; 




Total Net Financing ÷ Total Assets. The FINA shows a positive 
impact on the performance of the ICBs. A higher ratio of 
financing will indicate higher concern and vulnerability to 
duration gap. In risk-sensitive financing (RSF), the financing 
has a tendency to be influenced when the benchmark rates are 
moving upward or downward. More RSF means the DA will 
be higher than the DL. The FINA is modelled as net financing 
after loss provisions and adjustments.
(Ballester et al., 2009; Ehrmann and Worms, 2004; Rajha and 
Alslehat, 2014; Racic et al., 2014; Ruprecht et al., 2013)
+
BUCK
Total number of maturity buckets available in the respective 
bank. The empirical logic behind BUCK suggests that more 
assets maturing in longer time bands (buckets) should render 
duration of assets positive. (Elijah, 1985; Entrop et al., 2012; 
Ruprecht et al., 2013; Salman, 2013)
+
SIZEL
Log (Total Assets). The assets of each ICB were converted into 
US$ for the study’s observation (2007-2015). (Ballester et al., 
2009; Esposito et al., 2013; Racic et al., 2014; Ruprecht et 
al., 2013; Saporoschenko, 2002)
+
GDPG
Annual growth of respective country GDP in percentage. The 
data on GDPG for each sample country is retrieved from the 
World Bank database. (Entrop et al., 2012; Ruprecht et al., 2013)
+
RATE The RATE is extracted from the IMF IFS database. (Entrop et al., 2012) ?*
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Having outlined the variables, and before discussing the choice of Panel 
GMM, it is important to emphasise that the above-mentioned studies reflect 
three important observations: first, there are no available direct empirical studies 
or evidence focusing on the determinants of the duration gaps across the ICBs 
and over time; second, the available empirical studies — where the DGAP has 
been used as a dependent variable — have measured the impact of IRR or the 
determinants of IRR in a conventional sense using DGAP as a proxy11; third, 
most of these studies have used panel data regression with Random Effects or 
Fixed Effects, but none have used the Panel GMM (Difference or System) in their 
models. In this study, we considered the two impacts of holding the DGAP as 
the dependent variable: first, determining the factors influencing the duration of 
ICBs; and second, determining the on-balance sheet factors for the ROR impact on 
ICBs. First, the determination of the factors influencing the duration of ICBs; and 
second, the determination of the on-balance sheet factors for the ROR impact on 
ICBs. Consequently, the signs of the relationship between potential variables from 
the ICBs’ perspective are theoretically ambiguous, and so it becomes an empirical 
question, which is addressed in this study.
With the above in mind, we employ the following Panel GMM technique 
using STATA 13 software to estimate the relationship between the dependent 
variable and independent variables, and to increase the efficiency of estimation 
procedures. A brief literature on the GMM estimation and justification for its use, 
and a few issues pertaining to the GMM are presented below. 
Panel GMM - Estimation and Specifications
The ordinary least squares (OLS), a classical estimation technique in a linear 
regression model, tends to provide a partial view of the relationship and does not 
describe the relationship for panel data, in particular for short-term data. On the other 
hand, combining time-series and cross-section observations, panel data regression 
gives more informative data with more variability but less collinearity among the 
variables (Fauziah et al., 2009). This method provides more advantages, for instance: 
controlling for individual heterogeneity, reducing problems of multicollinearity, 
eliminating estimation bias, and capturing the dynamic relationship between 
independent variables and dependent variables (Ballester et al., 2009). 
11 Within these studies, for instance, Ballester et al. (2009) considered DGAP with absolute 
values. In addition, Entrop at el. (2012) used DGAP as a proxy for IRR. 
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Besides the widespread usage of GMM in conventional banking for years, 
GMM has also been used in Islamic finance by many authors, including El Alaoui et 
al. (2016), Othman and Masih (2015), and Abdul Wahab et al. (2017). Therefore, 
in the context of this study, given the data structure, the use of the Panel GMM 
framework is deemed appropriate. The choice of using the GMM in this study is 
driven by the data limitations of ICBs, composition of the data (i.e. heterogeneity 
across the banks), number of banks and observations, the sample period under 
observation, and dual banking systems (Table 1). The literature review primarily 
suggests dynamic models like GMM for bank-related analysis for cross-section and 
time-series panel data. 
Table 1: Complete sample of banks and observations
# Country Number of ICBs Observations
1 Bahrain 7 63
2 Bangladesh 3 27
3 Indonesia 2 18
4 Jordan 2 18
5 Kuwait 4 36
6 Malaysia 11 99
7 Pakistan 4 36
8 Qatar 4 36
9 Saudi Arabia 3 27
10 South Africa 1 9
11 Turkey 4 36
12 UAE 4 36
13 Yemen 1 9
Total 50 450
Note: The sample observations are for the study period 2007–2015.
To tackle the OLS complications, studies in the literature have recommended 
using of the GMM for dynamic panel data, as was proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991). This method uses a certain number of moment conditions specified for the 




Al-Iqtishad: Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi Syariah (Journal of Islamic Economics)
Vol. 13 (1), Jan-Jun 2021
the data. Therefore, panel GMM provides a remedy for the endogeneity problem 
suffered by OLS, by replacing the biased variables with the instrumental variables. 
In this respect, Arellano and Bond (1991) offered the practice of first difference lag 
levels for each variable as instrumental variables. The use of Difference estimators 
in the dynamic panel GMM model should eliminate bias potentially sourced from 
omitted variables in cross-sectional estimates (Masih and Masih, 1996). Due to 
some practical problems with the Difference GMM, Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) suggested the System GMM, which can offer greater 
flexibility to the variance-covariance structure. 
If we look at the finance literature, several studies demonstrate the advantages 
and disadvantages of both Difference and System GMM (Blundell and Bond, 
1998; Bun and Windmeijer, 2010; and Abdul Wahab et al., 2017). For instance, 
Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that the ‘System GMM’ performs better than the 
‘Difference GMM’ as it improves efficiency and may reduce the finite sample bias. 
In addition, Blundell and Bond (1998) and Wu and Bowe (2012) further discuss 
that the ‘System GMM’ is not necessarily superior to the ‘Difference GMM’ in 
cases where the autoregressive parameter is below 0.80. In our results, the choice of 
using the Difference GMM or System GMM is determined based on the coefficient 
of the lagged dependent variable. We use Difference and System GMM under 
‘two-step robust’ estimations as it is more efficient and reliable. 
Robustness Checks 
To check the consistency of the GMM estimators on the soundness of the 
instruments, there is a need to employ specification tests, as suggested by Arellano 
and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
The Arellano and Bond tests (AR1) and (AR2), examine the absence of first and 
second order serial correlation in the differenced residuals. For AR (1), the null 
hypothesis should be rejected, and the failure to reject the null hypothesis for AR 
(2) test indicates that model is robust. However, the Sargan-Hansen test indicates 
robustness for overriding restrictions of the instruments’ variables. In addition to 
Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel GMM robustness tests, RE and FE are performed 
before applying the Hausman specification test through STATA, to strengthen 
the results.
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Results and Discussions 
Duration Gap in ICBs
Among the 50 ICBs, the results reveal the important findings for the years 
2007-2015. In aggregate, the study results show a general excess of short-term 
liabilities and long-term financing (Figure 4). The results indicate that: (a) 82% 
of the ICBs (41 ICBs) have positive and higher duration gap; (b) only 18% 
(9 ICBs) tend to have negative duration gap; (c) positive duration gaps have 
more cross-sectional and time-series variations; and (d) 11 ICBs have duration 
gaps in double digit figures in terms of years (Table A.1). In addition, we also 
found that only three ICBs (Boubyan Islamic Bank, Al Barakah Bank Pakistan and 
Islamic International Arab Bank) have mean duration gaps close to zero. A close 
examination of these ICBs’ balance sheets reflects that they are managing their 
duration of assets and duration of liabilities more effectively through long-term 
liabilities and reduced concentration of financing for longer-term maturities. This 
implies that these ICBs would not be affected should their respective supervisory 
authorities increase the benchmark rate. However, the problem is much more severe 
in most other which have positive duration gaps, suggesting the need for crucial 
reviews of their business models. 
Figure 4: Variation of ICBs’ Duration Gap (2007-2015)
Note: The Duration Gap is measured in years for each bank. 
The highest among the ICBs, with a duration gap of 20.69 years, is AmIslamic 
Bank from Malaysia, and the lowest among the ICBs, with a duration gap of 
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gap) accounting for almost one-third of the duration gap for the period 2007-2015 
are as follows: AmIslamic Bank Berhad (20.69), Sharjah Islamic Bank (20.22), 
Bank Syariah Muamalat Indonesia (17.96), Al Barkah South Africa (15.77), and 
Bank Syariah Mandiri (15.56). Higher and positive duration gaps highlight the 
rationale for closely examining the business models of these ICBs to identify what 
is causing these ICBs to have higher duration gaps, which can consequently expose 
them to benchmark rate risk or ROR risk. Furthermore, despite higher duration 
gaps among the majority of the ICBs, there is evidence suggesting that nine ICBs 
have mean duration gaps less than zero (negative). In this respect, the bottom-
five ICBs (in terms of negative duration gap) are as follows: Khaleeji Commercial 
Bank (-3.21), Bank Islami Pakistan (-3.59), Tadhamon International Islamic Bank 
(-3.98), Al Salam Bank (-8.90), and KFH Bahrain (-13.71). This negative duration 
gap is an indication that a few ICBs have been managing the ALM more effectively. 
Figure 5: Trend of ICBs’ Duration Gap (2007-2015)
Note: The Duration Gap is measured in years for each country.
Besides the trend, it is also vital to establish which jurisdiction contributes 
towards much of the duration gap for the ICBs. In terms of countrywide findings 
(Figure 5), the results revealed two important observations for the study sample: 
(a) 10 countries (76%) tend to host positive and significant duration gap, and 
only three countries (Jordan, Yemen, and Bahrain) have negative duration gap 
for the sample period; and (b) five countries account for almost 85% of duration 
gap; Malaysia stands out as the highest with a duration gap of 100.34 years for 
11 ICBs, UAE with a duration gap of 47.97 years for 4 ICBs, Indonesia with a 
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duration gap of 33.53 years for 2 ICBs, Turkey with a duration gap of 24.05 years 
for 4 ICBs, and Saudi Arabia with a duration gap of 20.78 for 3 ICBS. It is worth 
noting that within the sample, Malaysia is the dominant jurisdiction representing 
significantly higher duration gaps indicating the vulnerability of the ICBs operating 
in this region. Thus, regional distribution of duration gap is skewed towards South 
East Asia followed by the ICBs in the GCC region (Table A.2).
In order to add more import to the existing literature with regards to 
ICBs with higher duration gaps, we examined the business models of these 
ICBs thoroughly by investigating their respective financial reports. This led to an 
appraisal of the key balance sheet indicators that could possibly explain the reasons 
behind their high duration gaps. These indicators included, among others: Average 
Financing to Total Assets Ratio (FINA); maturity bucket; and Average Cumulative 
Liquidity Gap to Total Assets (LIQG). The balance sheets of the ICBs suggest that 
Murābahah financing is the most dominant form of financing extended by the 
ICBs to customers to meet their different needs. Furthermore, the results reveal 
that there in a correlation between the FINA and the duration gap in some cases. 
However, this needs to be empirically tested to ascertain whether this factor, or 
any other factor significantly influences the duration gap with a larger sample size 
over a long period of time. We report these results in Section 5.2. 
The significantly higher duration gap can be attributed to the inspiration and 
business models of these ICBs, which have more long-term financing with short-term 
deposits, demonstrating the inability to raise the long-term deposits, consequently 
creating a severe mismatch in the assets and liabilities. This suggests that the size of 
the duration gap is correlated with lengthy asset duration but not with short (not 
long) liability duration (Chattha and Bacha, 2010). The finance theory and academic 
literature suggest, as pointed out in earlier, that when the duration gap is positive and 
higher, an increase in the benchmark rates by any basis points from the central bank 
would bring severe consequences to the net worth (NW) risk or economic value of 
equity (EVE) and the capital base of the banks (Chattha and Alhabshi, 2017, 2018). 
This suggests that the ICBs would have to keep more capital against ROR risk under 
ICAAP Pillar 2 of the Basel Accords. Our results are consistent with (Chattha and 
Alhabshi, 2017, 2018) and Chattha et al. (2019). 
We also infer from the results that ICBs tend to have higher duration gaps 
since they cannot avail of certain risk management tools and techniques due to 
certain Sharia limitations. These include: (a) lack of Sharia-compliant hedging 
instruments (e.g. swaps and options); (b) lack of financing or assets’ tradability 
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contracts; and (d) lack of floating-rate assets and fixed rate liabilities. Having 
examined the business models of the ICBs across the 13 jurisdictions of the sample 
under observation, this study confirms that all of the above factors influence the 
duration gaps of the ICBs, positively and negatively. 
In addition, we also attribute the ICBs’ variations in duration gap to the 
different reporting standards (e.g. AAOIFI), in particular the disclosure of the 
maturity of assets and liabilities in different maturity buckets. There was little 
evidence available to suggest that the ICBs have implemented the AAOIFI 
accounting standards. We found that the majority of the ICBs keep financing 
in the long-term maturity bucket, and rely very scarcely on long-term funding 
liabilities such as PSIA or savings deposits. This reflects that ICBs should not 
hold financing in long-term maturity buckets, and should have more reliance on 
long-term funding liabilities, including PSIA or Sukūk financing through Sharia 
-compliant securitisation.12 This observation is included in our study panel data to 
determine whether this has any influence on the duration gaps of the ICBs. The 
empirical results using GMM are explained in Section 5.2.
Robustness Analysis of Duration Gap of ICBs – Comparison with CCBs
As a detailed comparative analysis of ICBs and CCBs is beyond the scope 
of this paper,13 nonetheless, to ensure that our results are robust and significant 
with respect to duration gap, we undertook a comparative approach to show the 
implications from both sides of the banking system. We selected the top 35 ICBs 
(70% of the sample ICBs) in terms of their asset size, and compared them with 
CCBs with similar asset size across 11 countries within the sample for the period 
2009-2015.14 This ensured that the comparison made is reliable and consistent. By 
plotting the duration gaps for both ICBs and CCBs among the 35 paired samples 
used, we find that the variance is much larger for the ICBs than the CCBs for the 
sample period 2009-2015 (Figure 6). 
12 There is also some evidence of the same from a few ICBs which have issued Sukūk to raise 
long-term funding. While this has not been a common phenomenon due to the underlying Sharī’ah 
and regulatory requirements, it can help in managing the duration gaps of ICBs.
13 We present in a separate study the detailed analysis of 100 banks in dual banking systems, 
which reflect the implications for CCBs and ICBs, for 13 countries on a comparative basis. 
14 These top 35 ICBs accounted for 95% of the total sample asset size for Islamic banks. The 
size of the 35 ICBs was almost equal to 90% of the CCBs. We also ensured that the comparison 
period excluded the crisis years. The pairing is consistent with research of Chattha and Alhabshi, 
2017, 2018) and Chattha et al. (2019) on duration gaps comparison in dual banking systems.
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Figure 6: Comparative Analysis of Mean Duration Gap of Banks (2009-2015)
Note: The Mean Duration Gap is measured in years for each bank. In order to obtain the Mean 
Duration Gap, the Duration Gap of each bank for 2009-2015 is estimated for both ICBs and CCBs. 
The list comparing the 35 CCBs with similar sized ICBs is in Table A.3.
In addition, the results also revealed that ICBs have a tendency to have a 
higher (more) duration gap, specifically 159.12 years (with a mean duration gap 
of 22.73 years), in comparison to their conventional counterparts, CCBs, which 
recorded a duration gap of 66.54 years (with a mean duration gap of 9.11 years). 
This shows that the ICBs have 2.39 times more mean duration gap compared to the 
CCBs, reflecting serious implications for risk management and risk culture among 
the sample banks. Our results are consistent with Chattha and Bacha (2010). 
 From the results we establish that, overall, the duration gap of all banks 
under observation increased; however, ICBs have a general tendency of maintaining 
a higher duration gap compared to their conventional counterparts, the CCBs. 
For instance, for the ICBs, the duration gap remained in the range of 20-28 
years, compared to the CCBs’ range of 7-11 years (Figure 7). In order to further 
statistically validate our findings of ICBs having a larger duration gap compared 
to their conventional counterparts, CCBs, we run the parametric t-test for paired 
samples (35), for both one-tail and two-tail tests (i.e. t-Test: Paired Two Sample for 
Means). The results supported our argument, as the sample statistics (2.27) fulfil 
the critical value of 5% confidence level (2.03) to reject the null hypothesis, with 
the probability of the one-tail test (p = 0.01) and two-tail test (p = 0.02) both 
being significant.15 The results confirm a significant difference in the duration gaps 
15 Generally, the following rules are applied for the hypothesis: (a) If the absolute t Stat 
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of ICBs compared to CCBs, and ICBs have a higher mean duration than CCBs. 
This shows that ICBs are more vulnerable to ROR risk, and suffer significant 
implications for their balance sheet adjustment in the light of changing benchmark 
rate risk.16
Figure 7: Magnitude of Duration Gap of Banks (2009-2015)
Note: The Duration Gap is measured in years for banks.
Determinants of ICBs’ duration gap 
This section, through an empirical model, establishes that there are factors 
which can explain the duration gaps. The results of the study are discussed below. 
Correlation Matrix
The correlation matrix between the variables is presented in Table 2, for 
comprehending any multicollinearity in the data. The results obtained provide 
confirmation of the variables — that there is no multicollinearity in the sample 
data. In only one case, the correlation between DGAP and LIQG is above 0.50. 
Thus, there are no variables which are significantly correlated with each other, 
which could have caused estimation problems. Consequently, including all of these 
variables as regressors simultaneously should not cause the estimated coefficients 
to be unstable and unreliable (Ballester et al., 2009). Thus, we use these variables 
in the GMM. 
p-value is less than alpha (level of significance), then it is significant. 
16 In light of these results, we show in a separate study the quantification of the impact on the 
ICBs and CCBs under stress scenarios of various basis points in line with the IFSB and the BCBS.
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Table 2: Pearson Correlation Matrix
 DGAP LIQG LIQR FINA BUCK SIZEL GDPG
DGAP 1
LIQG -0.5676* 1
LIQR -0.0273 0.2892* 1
FINA 0.4194* -0.2610* -0.4602* 1
BUCK 0.0647 -0.1247* -0.0047 -0.1922* 1
SIZEL 0.1232* -0.1869* -0.2598* 0.1777* -0.3818* 1
GDPG 0.0215 -0.0074 0.0542 -0.0408 0.0216 0.0131 1
RATE -0.0647 0.1379* 0.037 -0.1289* 0.3159* -0.3551* -0.0981*
Note: The table shows the correlation matrix between the variables. 
Note: Bold numbers represent correlations above 0.5. 
Note: The descriptive statistics using STATA (minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation, 
N=450, n= 50, T=9) of the panel data estimation using Difference and System GMM are available 
upon request.
Normality and Heterogeneity Conditions 
Although normality17 is not a condition for Panel GMM, it is advisable 
to check for extreme weights and outliers before starting any analysis. The study, 
in Figure 8, plots the data and indicates the normality of the data observation 
for clarity and understanding. The red-dotted line clearly indicates that the data 
is normally distributed, and there is no abnormality nor outliers in the balanced 
panel data under observation. An important reflection is that the effect of the GFC 
cannot be seen to be suggesting that crises have no significant impact on the ICBs’ 
variables. Therefore, the expected results from the GMM output should reflect no 
significance of the GFC dummy variable included in panel GMM for Difference 
and System estimations.
17 As explained in Section 4, GMM does not assume normality and it allows for 
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Figure 8: Plotting Normal Distribution Using STATA 
Figure 9 plots the study’s sample observation data and indicates that the 
data has Heterogeneity features, reflecting that each sample country has its own 
characteristics and, thus, it is expected that some differences would exist for the 
ICBs under study. This Heterogeneity is handled easily by the GMM technique, 
instead of using the OLS classic regression. Therefore, in the context of this study, 
the use of Panel GMM framework, to control simultaneously for country and ICBs’ 
characteristic effects, while taking into account heterogeneity across banks, validates 
the use of this model and is appropriate given the study’s data structure. 
Figure 9: Plotting Heterogeneity across ICBs Using STATA 
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Difference and System GMM Estimation Results and Discussion
In this subsection, we present the relationship between seven idiosyncratic 
variables and duration gap, which is analysed by using both Difference and System 
GMM. 
First, after running Panel GMM (Difference) two-step vce (robust), with 
number of observations 350, number of groups 50, and number of instruments 37, 
the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation indicated that DGAP L1 (lagged 
dependent variable) is significant, with a p-value of 0.04, and its coefficient is positive, 
at 0.140. In respect to regressors, four out of five bank-specific variables such as LIQG, 
FINA, BUCK, and SIZEL are found to be significant with p-values of 0.05, 0.07, 
0.07, and 0.002 respectively. However, LIQR and both macroeconomic variables, 
GDPG and RATE, are not found to be statistically significant (Table 3). These results 
confirmed the results of ‘one-step’ and ‘one-step vce (robust)’.18 
Second, after running Panel GMM (Difference), the study also ran Panel 
GMM (System) two-step vce (robust), with number of observations 400, number 
of groups 50, and number of instruments 44. The System dynamic estimation 
showed that DGAP L1 is significant, with a p-value of 0.02, and its coefficient is 
positive, at 0.236. This demonstrates that the value of the lagged dependent variable 
has increased under Panel GMM (System). With regards to regressors, three out 
of the five bank-specific regressors (LIQG, FINA, and SIZEL) are significant, with 
p-values of 0.05, 0.04, and 0.017 respectively. Under GMM (System), BUCK 
became insignificant and LIQR is found significant at p-value 0.105. In addition, 
both macroeconomic variables, GDPG and RATE, are found to be insignificant 
(Table 3). 
Referring to Table 3, the choice of using the Difference GMM or System 
GMM is determined based on the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, 
and in our case, Panel GMM (Difference) would be applicable as the autoregressive 
parameter 0.22 is below 0.80. Therefore, using Panel GMM (Difference), it can 
be concluded that there is strong evidence suggesting that except one variable 
(the LIQR) in the estimation, all the remaining four bank-specific variables, 
FINA, BUCK, SIZE, and LIQG, are found to be significant, and proven to be 
effective in explaining and determining the ICBs’ duration gap as per the sign of 
their coefficients. This means that these variables can play an important role in 
18 It is worth mentioning that prior to performing a two-step vce (robust), we performed 
‘one-step’ and ‘one-step vce (robust)’. The empirical results of ‘one-step’ and ‘one-step vce (robust)’ 
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influencing the duration gap positively or negatively. Consequently, the results also 
indicate the ROR risk applicable to the ICBs. 





























Z statistics in parentheses
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
HO: no autocorrelation
Note: This table presents the results of two-step robust Difference GMM and 
System GMM estimations for a sample of 50 ICBs in 13 countries for the period 
2007–2015. 
Note: It is worth mentioning that we had to run xtabond2 to get the Hansen test 
robustness as no Sargan test is available for vce (robust) estimation.
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Furthermore, it is also essential to highlight that the macroeconomic 
variables (GDPG and RATE) are not found to be significant, indicating no relation 
to the determination of the ICBs’ duration gap. In the case of the crisis dummy 
variable, the GFC was also found to be insignificant in all cases, suggesting no 
impact on ICBs’ duration gaps. This was expected since there was no abnormality 
in the data for the crisis years 2008 and 2009. Under Panel GMM estimation, 
both standard robustness AR tests, as discussed below, are found to be significant, 
thereby increasing the reliability of the Panel GMM estimation.19 In respect to the 
study results, it should be noted that our results are in line with the findings of 
Saporoschenko (2002), Ballester et al. (2009), Entrop et al. (2012), Ruprecht et 
al. (2013), and Esposito et al. (2013). 
In particular, after having discussed the significance results, we examine 
the direction of the regressors’ coefficients and their implications. For instance, 
in the case of FINA, it seems natural to expect a positive association between 
this ratio and the ICBs’ duration gap and ROR risk. This finding is consistent 
with the results obtained by Ballester et al. (2009), Entrop et al. (2012), and 
Ruprecht et al. (2013) using a different methodology. It also suggests that ICBs 
that hold a larger percentage of assets in the form of Sharia-compliant financing 
have a larger degree of ROR risk and duration gap. One possible clarification for 
this finding is that the larger relative weight of Sharia -compliant financing in 
the ICBs’ balance sheet causes an increase in the traditional maturity mismatch 
between the bank’s assets and liabilities. The mismatch can influence the duration 
gap both positively and negatively, depending on the direction of the maturity 
mismatch. This is also the case in the LIQG, which is also significant with a 
negative coefficient, similar to Esposito et al. (2013). This finding suggests a 
significant correlation between liquidity risk and ROR risk and duration gaps; 
the ICBs facing higher liquidity risk may decrease their on-balance-sheet duration 
gap more suddenly. 
19 In addition to the independent variables identified in Equation 4, the study also included 
two additional variables to examine their impact on duration gap. These two variables included 
DEPO (Total deposits to Total Assets) and FDR (Total Financing to Deposit Ratio). While the 
FDR is similar to FINA, the DEPO indicates the degree of dependability of deposits with respect 
to duration gap (Racic et al., 2014; Ruprecht et al., 2013; Saporoschenko, 2002). However, when 
FDR was included in the model, the significance of the FINA decreased considerably. The DEPO 
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Robustness Checks with Arellano–Bond Tests in Panel GMM Estimation
To check the robustness of results, the study performed the Arellano-Bond 
test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors, and second-order serial 
correlation induced by the difference estimators under the dynamic Difference 
and System GMM. As indicated in Section 4, Estat abond reports the Arellano–
Bond tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at order m. In this 
case, HO: no autocorrelation should be rejected at order 1 (i.e. AR (1)). However, 
rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-differenced errors 
at an order greater than one (AR (2)) implies model misspecification (Yalta and 
Yalata, 2010).
In terms of diagnostics for the validity of the instruments, as indicated in 
Section 4, the results of robustness are reported in Table 3. Both standard AR tests 
are found to be significant, where the study rejects the AR (1) (p-value = 0.0065 
for Difference GMM and p-value = 0.0069 for System GMM), and similarly 
the study failed to reject the AR (2) (p-value = 0.3070 for Difference GMM 
and p-value = 0.2262 for System GMM). This fulfils the standard requirement 
for validating the GMM estimation. In addition, the results of the Hansen test 
(p-value = 0.291 for Difference GMM and p-value = 0.165 for System GMM) 
of overriding restrictions indicate that the instruments are valid (Table 3). Hence, 
the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions indicates that the instruments are 
valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. These robustness 
results indicate the reliability of the GMM test and the validity of the instruments 
with respect to the study. 
Fixed Effect and Random Effect Estimation: Robustness Check
In order to further check the robustness, FE (within) Regression and RE 
GLS Regression was also performed. The summary results of FE and RE presented 
in Table 4 confirmed the results of the GMM. In fact, all five bank-specific variables 
(LIQG, LIQR, FINA, and SIZEL BUCK) were found to be significant under FE 
Regression, with p-values of 0.000, 0.000, 0.001, 0.006, and 0.05 respectively. 
In addition, similar to Panel GMM, both macroeconomic variables are 
found to be not significant. However, when RE GLS Regression was run, only 
one of the five regressors, SIZEL, was found to be insignificant. After running the 
Hausman test to choose between FE and RE, the study ran FE Regression and 
found that SIZEL remained insignificant. 
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Hausman test: Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Based on the empirical analysis results, the study established the 
following: first, in our case, duration gaps are significantly affected by changes 
in endogenous variables rather than exogenous factors; second, due to substantial 
heterogeneity within the system, overall, ICBs show a considerable degree of 
exposure to duration gap and ROR risk; third, the FINA, BUCK, LIQG and 
SIZEL appear to be the most important determinants of ICBs’ duration gap and 
ROR risk; fourth, macroeconomic variables do not display a significant relationship 
with the duration gap; fifth, the crisis did not have any significant impact upon 
ICBs in terms of explaining the duration gap; and finally, liquidity did not cast 
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possible explanation for the lack of impact of the LIQR could be that it was not 
included in the estimation of DGAP, as liquid assets tend to have shorter maturity 
and hence their duration would be extremely small, if at all applicable. This was 
the reason the study excluded from the calculation of the duration gap any assets 
with one-month maturity.
In the context of our results, the major apprehension is the regressor 
coefficient sign related to SIZEL, where it is found to be statistically significant 
but its coefficient is found to be negative, indicating that the ICBs’ are inefficient 
at intermediation. Although the correlation coefficient between SIZEL and 
DGAP is found to be positive, it is important to highlight that in most cases 
it is expected to have a positive relationship. However, literature has found both 
positive and negative signs associated with SIZEL, with different explanations (Au 
Yong et al., 2009; Fraser et al., 2002; Faff et al., 2005; Reichert and Shyu, 2003; 
Saporoschenko, 2002). 
In light of the above findings, and taking into account results of the 
robustness tests, specifically the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-
differenced errors and second-order serial correlation, the study infers that there 
is strong evidence suggesting significant difference in the estimated coefficients’ 
idiosyncratic factors influencing the duration gaps of the ICBs in the study, and 
subsequently, the null hypothesis could be rejected with reliable estimates and 
validity of the instruments.
Conclusions
The study provides empirical evidence regarding the estimation of the 
duration gap of 50 ICBs from 13 countries. Using the Duration Gap model, the 
study established that among the 50 ICBs, most banks showed more cross-sectional 
and time-series variations in duration gap. This revealed that the ICBs are exposed 
to increasing ROR risk due to their larger duration gaps and severe liquidity 
mismatches. As per finance theory, the higher the duration gap, the higher would 
be the profit rate sensitivity of a financial instrument, and vice-versa. There is also 
evidence that some ICBs had lower gaps over the last few years, reflecting effective 
ALM practices. It was also established that ICBs tend to maintain a higher (more) 
duration gap than conventional counterparts, the CCBs. The higher duration gap 
in the ICBs is attributed to the inspiration and business model of these ICBs. 
Without a stable and long-term funding base, and the HQLA on the assets side, 
ICBs are rendered less resilient to exogenous liquidity shocks. Within the study 
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sample it was also observed that in terms of duration gap there exist regional 
differences between the ICBs. 
By adopting Panel GMM estimation (Difference), the findings of the 
study indicate that duration gaps are significantly affected by changes in 
endogenous variables rather than by exogenous factors. We found a significant 
difference in the estimated coefficients of the idiosyncratic factors influencing the 
duration gaps of ICBs. The results reflect the ROR risk to the ICBs through 
balance sheet indicators. In this respect, the ICBs have a considerable degree of 
exposure to duration gap and ROR risk, and the FINA, BUCK, LIQG, and SIZEL 
appear to be the most important determinants of the same. However, there is not 
enough evidence to suggest the significance of GDPG and RATE’s macroeconomic 
variables on the duration gap. To ensure more rigorous results of the model, both 
the FE and RE regressions were also performed, which consequently confirmed 
the results of Panel GMM. Both standard robustness Arellano Bond (AR) tests for 
autocorrelation and Sargan-Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions are found 
to be significant, increasing the reliability of the Panel GMM estimation and 
the validity of the instruments. In the context of the GMM findings, the study 
provides an empirical basis for the ICBs to address bank-specific variables that are 
significant. The understanding of the underlying factors explaining ICBs’ ROR risk 
and duration gap is essential for different economic agents and stakeholders — such 
as ICBs’ senior management, who want to adequately manage their duration gap 
and ROR risk exposure, and ICBs’ regulators, who are primarily concerned with 
the assessment of ROR in the banking book of the ICBs and the stability and 
soundness of the banking system. 
The variations in ICBs’ duration gaps could be attributed to the different 
reporting standards, in particular the disclosure of the maturity of assets and liabilities 
in different maturity buckets. On the other hand, the ICBs’ business model of having 
more long-term financing with short-term deposits demonstrates their inability to 
raise long-term deposits, consequently creating a severe mismatch in the assets and 
liabilities. To reduce the duration gap, on the asset side, ICBs should engage in 
the diversification of their financing into medium-term maturities and liquid assets 
(e.g., HQLA). The ICBs should also continuously monitor and control the gaps 
between maturing assets and liabilities in various time buckets. In this respect, the 
ICBs should have in place the approved limits set by their respective BOD for the 
maximum duration gap. The ALCO should implement these limits. 
Given that global benchmark rates are currently low, having fallen steadily 
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will pose a serious challenge to ICBs as the benchmark rate cycle turns. For the 
ICBs to fully deflect this risk, while being part of a dual banking system, it would 
require them to undertake significant improvements in their risk management tools 
(such as stress testing) and applying innovative new techniques including PLS, to 
reduce the asset-liability mismatches.
Limitations and Future Direction
While the results are consistent with some existing studies, it is important 
to note that this study reported findings with the use of Panel GMM, which no 
previous study has done with respect to the ICBs. In addition, due to different 
accounting definitions and formulations of the regressors in this study, the results 
are expected to be, to some extent, different compared to the previous studies. As 
to our knowledge, no prior studies have explained the determinants, along with 
the precise estimation, of the duration gaps of the ICBs, as done in this study 
using the Panel GMM. 
Given that this is a pioneer study in Islamic finance to measure the factors of 
duration gap, it would be desirable to undertake more studies with long-term data, 
additional variables, and a larger sample in order to establish stronger correlations 
for the ICBs. It would also be useful to apply the same factors in the conventional 
setting (i.e. for CCBs), with a similar model, to establish the robustness of the 
estimation. Finally, in addition to Panel GMM estimation, a qualitative approach 
(in the form of a survey) for factors determining DGAP and DGAP management 
practices across more than 100 ICBs can be undertaken, to see whether there is 
any significant difference and relationship in results when using primary data and 
secondary data. 
Appendix A: Duration Gaps of ICBs
Table A.1: Details of ICBs’ Duration Gap at ICBs’ Level
No. ICB Bank Name Country




1 AmIslamic Bank Berhad Malaysia 20.69 Positive
2 Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 20.22 Positive
3 Bank Syariah Muamalat Indonesia Indonesia 17.96 Positive
4 Al Barkah South Africa South Africa 15.77 Positive
5 Bank Syariah Mandiri Indonesia 15.56 Positive
6 Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE 14.61 Positive
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No. ICB Bank Name Country




7 Emirates Islamic Bank UAE 11.71 Positive
8 Al Rajhi Saudi Arabia 11.04 Positive
9 AlRajhi Malaysia Berhad Malaysia 10.80 Positive
10 RHB Islamic Bank Berhad Malaysia 10.41 Positive
11 Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad Malaysia 10.19 Positive
12 Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad Malaysia 9.51 Positive
13 Public Islamic Bank Berhad Malaysia 9.18 Positive
14 ABC Islamic Bank Bahrain 9.11 Positive
15 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad Malaysia 8.94 Positive
16 Masraf Al Rayan Qatar 8.19 Positive
17 CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad Malaysia 8.05 Positive
18 Al Barakah Turkish Finance House Turkey 7.37 Positive
19 Turkiye Finans Participation Bank Turkey 7.18 Positive
20 Bank Asya Turkey 7.02 Positive
21 Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar 6.76 Positive
22 Bank Al Bilad Saudi Arabia 6.09 Positive
23 Qatar Islamic Bank Qatar 5.30 Positive
24 Exim Bank Ltd Bangladesh 5.08 Positive
25 KFH Malaysia Berhad Malaysia 4.83 Positive
26 Bahrain Islamic Bank Bahrain 4.70 Positive
27 Affin Islamic Bank Berhad Malaysia 4.21 Positive
28 Ithmaar Bank Bahrain 3.71 Positive
29 Bank Al Jazira Saudi Arabia 3.65 Positive
30 Asian Finance Bank Berhad Malaysia 3.52 Positive
31 Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Pakistan 3.36 Positive
32 Kuwait International Bank Kuwait 2.72 Positive
33 Kuvet Turk Participation Bank Turkey 2.48 Positive
34 First Security Islamic Bank Bangladesh 2.06 Positive
35 Meezan Islamic Bank Pakistan 1.69 Positive
36 AL Barka Bank Bahrain Bahrain 1.57 Positive
37 Dubai Islamic Bank UAE 1.42 Positive
38 Ahli United Bank Kuwait 1.08 Positive
39 Boubyan Islamic Bank Kuwait 0.90 Positive
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No. ICB Bank Name Country




41 Islamic International Arab Bank Jordan 0.39 Positive
42 KFH Kuwait Kuwait -0.87 Negative
43 Islamic Bank Bangladesh Ltd Bangladesh -1.05 Negative
44 Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan -1.84 Negative
45 Barwa Bank Qatar -3.18 Negative
46 Khaleeji Commercial Bank Bahrain -3.21 Negative
47 Bank Islami Pakistan Pakistan -3.59 Negative
48 Tadhamon International Islamic Bank Yemen -3.98 Negative
49 Al Salam Bank Bahrain -8.90 Negative
50 KFH Bahrain Bahrain -13.71 Negative
Note: The list of ICBs is presented in order of the size of duration gap. The details of the ICBs’ 
duration gap estimations for 2007-2015 are available upon request.
Table A.2: Details of ICBs’ Duration Gap at Country Level
No. ICB Bank Name Number of ICBs




1 Malaysia 11 100.34 Positive
2 UAE 4 47.97 Positive
3 Indonesia 2 33.53 Positive
4 Turkey 4 24.05 Positive
5 Saudi Arabia 3 20.78 Positive
6 Qatar 4 17.06 Positive
7 South Africa 1 15.77 Positive
8 Bangladesh 3 6.08 Positive
9 Kuwait 4 3.82 Positive
10 Pakistan 4 2.26 Positive
11 Jordan 2 -1.46 Negative
12 Yemen 1 -3.98 Negative
13 Bahrain 7 -6.73 Negative
Note: The list of countries is presented in order of the size of duration gap. 
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Table A.3: Details of CCBs’ Duration Gap 
No. CCB Bank Name Grand Total
Mean 





1 ABC Bank (Bahrain) 1.79 0.26 18 Capitecbank (South 
Africa)
0.39 0.06
2 Affin Bank (Malaysia) 3.49 0.50 19 CBK Bank (Kuwait) 0.01 0.00
3 Al Khaleeji Commercial 
(Qatar)
2.10 0.30 20 Commercial Bank of 
Dubai (UAE)
-0.04 -0.01
4 Alliance Bank (Malaysia) 1.34 0.19 21 Faysal Bank (Pakistan) -0.15 -0.02
5 AmBank (Malaysia) 13.28 1.90 22 Gulf Bank (Kuwait) 6.52 0.93
6 Anadolubank A.Ş. 
(Turkey)
3.77 0.54 23 Habib Metro Bank 
(Pakistan)
-0.53 -0.08
7 Bank Al Etihad (Jordan) -0.05 -0.01 24 HBL Bank (Pakistan) -2.34 -0.33
8 Bank Al Falah (Pakistan) 1.42 0.20 25 Hong Leong Bank 
(Malaysia)
2.12 0.30
9 Bank AlHabib (Pakistan) -0.19 -0.03 26 Mashreq Bank (UAE) 2.71 0.39
10 Bank BJB (Indonesia) 2.78 0.40 27 MCB Bank (Pakistan) 0.12 0.02
11 Bank BNI (Indonesia) -0.08 -0.01 28 National Bank of 
Bahrain (Bahrain)
2.87 0.41
12 Bank of Punjab 
(Pakistan)
-0.86 -0.12 29 NBK Bank (Kuwait) 0.92 0.13
13 Bank of Sharjah (UAE) -0.54 -0.08 30 NBP Bank (Pakistan) 2.25 0.32
14 Bank Panin (Indonesia) 0.76 0.11 31 RAK Bank (UAE) 9.20 1.31
15 Burgan Bank (Kuwait) 1.18 0.17 32 RHB Bank (Malaysia) 2.89 0.41
16 Burgan Bank A.Ş. 
(Turkey)
1.47 0.21 33 Saudi France Bank 
(Saudi Arabia)
2.00 0.29
17 Cairo Amman Bank 
(Jordan)
0.06 0.01 34 UBL Bank (Pakistan) -0.02 0.00
 35 United Arab Bank 
(UAE)
5.91 0.84
Note: The Mean Duration Gap (i.e. summation of duration gap for 2009-2015 divided by number 
of years, which is seven years) is measured in years for each bank. In order to obtain the Mean 
Duration Gap of one CCB, the Duration Gap of each bank for 2009-2015 is estimated. The details 
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